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AND FRAUD TYPE EFFECTS ON FRAUD DETECTION RESPONSIBILITY
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Diponegoro University, Indonesia Faculty of Economics and Business,
Sriwijaya University, Palembang, Indonesia Imam Ghozali Faculty of
Economics and Business, Diponegoro University, Indonesia Fuad Fuad 
Faculty of Economics and Business, Diponegoro University, Indonesia Etna
Nur Afri Yuyetta Faculty of Economics and Business, Diponegoro University,
Indonesia ABSTRACT Based on the triangle model of responsibility
(Schlerker 1994), this study examines the effects of fraud type and
accountability on internal auditor perceived responsibility for fraud
detection. The 3x2 between subject experimental design was conducted to
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address the research questions. The fraud type variable was manipulated at
three levels namely fraudulent financial reporting (FFR), misappropriation of
assets (MoA) and corruption (CRR and the accountability was manipulated
as accountable (ACC) and anonymous (ANN). The participants of experiment
consits of 92 internal auditors. Data analysis conducted used one-way anova
and independent sample t-test.The results show that there are no significant
differences for internal auditors to detect fraud among the three types of
fraud. Other results show that the accountable internal auditors demonstrate
a higher perceived responsibility in detecting fraud than anonymous. The
implication of this finding suggests that government agencies might provide
clearly guidances and references to detecting fraud in the government
agencies area. Pertaining to the role of accountability pressure, review of the
auditor's performance is required in order for the internal auditors to have
greater responsibility and effort in detecting fraud. Key words: Fraud Type;
Accountability; Responsibility; Triangle Model of Responsibility. 
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp 424 Cite this Article: Yusnaini
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Technology, 8(8), 2017, pp. 424–436. 
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1. INTRODUCTION Indonesia is the 20th ranked countries and territories of
the most corrupt in the public sector, according to data reported by
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2013. Another form of fraud cases
related to the procurement of goods and services. Lack of responsibility and
ability of the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (GISA) or Aparat
Pengawas Intern Pemerintah (APIP) in detecting fraud is one of root causes
of that condition. Indonesian Government Internal Auditors Association
(IGIAA) or Asosiasi Auditor Internal Pemerintah Indonesia (AAIPI) reported
that 94 percent of APIP is not able to detect fraud. However, Government
Regulation No. 79 of 2005 stated that the Government Internal Supervisory
Apparatus (APIP) has duty to control the government affairs or considered
as an internal auditor in accordance with its functions and authority
(Presiden Republik Indonesia 2005). This study intends to develop these
issues by examining that matters relating to the responsibility of internal
auditors to detect fraud in Indonesian government. Internal audit standards
do not prescribe different detection responsibilities for fraudulent financial
reporting (FFR), misappropriation of assets (MoA), and corruption (CRR) 
that have a direct and material effect on the financial statements. However,
the research literature provided evidence and suggested that perceived
responsibility of professional for fraud detection differ across fraud types
(Dezoort and Harrison 2008, ACFE 2008, KPMG 2003 and 2006). In this
study, the accountability refers to concept of accountability of the social
contingency model. The concept suggests that accountability pressures can
stimulate politically motivated needs to sustain the positives of constituents
important evaluations (Tetlock 1992). In this case, when a government
internal auditor (APIP) has no high responsibility for detecting fraud, their
accountability will be questionable by the public. Several studies have shown
the role of accountability to affect the auditor performance (Asare et al.,
2000; Tan&Kao 1999;Cloyd 1997; Koonce et al., 1995; Tan 1995; Ashton
1990), affects the effects of dilution and audit evidence (Glover 1997;
Hoffman&Patton 1997 and Tan 1995) and have influenced opinion and
judgment audit (Kennedy 1993; Ashton 1992; Johson&Kaplan 1991,
Buchman et al. 1996 and Lerner&Tetlock 1999). Dezoort and Harrison
(2008) study showed that accountability (ACC) and anonymous (ANN)
influenced perceived responsibility in detecting fraud. The finding of this
study shows that there are no significant differences for internal auditors to
detect fraud among the three types of fraud. Moreover, there are significant
differences for internal auditors in detecting fraud between ACC and ANN
internal auditor accountability. ANN auditors have higher degree of 
perceived responsibility for detecting fraud than ANN auditors 2.
LITERATURE REVIEWS 2.1. Internal Auditors’ Standards Related to Fraud
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International Standard IIA (The Institute of Internal Auditors') for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards) provides specific
authoritative guidance for internal auditors in fraud field. As stated by
Standard 1210.A2 that internal auditors should have sufficient knowledge to
evaluate fraud risks to manage organization. However, it can not be
predicted how such skill sets a person with the responsibility to detect and
investigate fraud. The internal audit standards explain that there are
pressures of various parties to improve fraud standards for internal auditors.
Furthermore, the risk management standard (2120.A2) states that the
function of internal auditor is to evaluate the activity of potential fraud and
how the organization manages fraud risk. The standard is clearly connected
to the internal audit function of fraud risk management. However, these
standards do not directly talk about the responsibilities of internal auditors
to detect fraud. Furthermore, literature showed insufficient evidence of the
perceived responsibilities of internal auditors to detect fraud and how such
perceptions affect performance of fraud. According to the Indonesian
Government Internal Audit Standards (Asosiasi Auditor Intern Pemerintah
Indonesia (AAIPI) 2014), auditor is a position that has scope, duties,
responsibilities, and authority to conduct internal audit in government
agencies, organizations and/or other parties in a state in accordance with
the law's invitation, which is occupied by civil servants with rights and
obligations granted by the competent authority. Based on description of the
implementation of the standards, we can conclude that auditors should have
sufficient competence to perform the potential fraud detection. However,
from the details of the Indonesian Government Internal Audit Standards,
there is no rule which asserts that the auditor is obliged directly to conduct
fraud detection in government agencies as an auditee. The extant literatures
have lacks in research evidence for evaluating the internal auditors'
perceived responsibility on fraud detection and how this sense of
responsibility affects fraud- related performance. By default, there are no
binding rules for the internal auditors to have duties and responsibility to
detect and investigate the occurrence of fraud (Standard 1210.A2, IIA 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing).
Standard of internal audit suggests that the existence of professional
responsibility for internal auditors to detect fraud that intends to create a
sense of responsibility the auditor. However, not much is known about the
extent to which internal auditors perceive a responsibility to detect fraud or
factors underlying the responsibility for what they feel (DeZoort&Harrison,
2008). 2.2. The Triangle Model of Responsibility Schlenker's triangle model
(Schlenker 1997) identified several reasons that people use to avoid
responsibility after failure: that one has no control in situation, liability is
not clear, and it is not really one's duties. From this perspective, we can
assume that there is a negative relationship between making excuses and
take responsibility. The triangle models of responsibility considers how
people make excuses, so as to avoid taking responsibility for personal
failure. In a sense, the model considers the ways people behave in “in bad
faith” dignity and a sense of personal responsibility by shifting the mistakes
of others. The triangle is a model of responsibility proposed by Schlenker
and colleagues (Schlenker et al. 1994; 2001), defined as a statement of
reasons or attributions that allows one to “minimize liability personal to an
event” (Schlenker et al., 1994, p. 637), both for theirself and with
others.Thus, making reason is partly an emotional control tool and as an
impression-management tool (Doherty and Schlenker, 1995, Schlenker et
al., 1994). The triangle model illustrates three important aspects of the
responsibilities include: prescription (ie, what should be done), the identity
(ie, sense of self), and the situation or event (that is relevant to the
prescription). Figure 1 shows a model of responsibility Schlenker known as
the Triangle Models of Responsibility. Figure 1 The Triangle Model of
Responsibility (Schlenker, 1994) Schlenker (1994) in Figure 1 on the
triangle model of responsibility showed that the prescription-event (task
clarity) link is considered weaker when the prescription is ambiguous,
conflicting, difficult to prioritize, or questionable in terms of relevance to the
11/27/2018 Turnitin
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=1&eb=1&esm=10&oid=1045368629&sid=0&n=0&m=2&svr=340&r=16.39918500810007&l… 5/11
event. Otherwise, the link will be stronger to the extent that the prescription
are specified in advance, pertinent to the situation, not subject to
alternative interpretations, and not in conflict with other prescriptions that
might be applied in the situation. The prescription-identity (professional
obligation) link is weaker when the prescription is ambiguous, unclear, or
conflicting. In contrast the link will be stronger to the extent that
prescriptions apply unambiguously to the individual. The identity-event
(personal control) link is weaker when an individual’s will act is diminished
because action consequences are unforeseeable, accidental, or influenced by
uncontrollable factors. However, this link will be stronger when an individual
intends to produce specific consequences and had ability and freedom. 3.
HYPOTHESES 3.1. The Impact of Fraud Type on Perceived Responsibility
According to internal audit standards, there is no difference perceived
responsibility in detection fraud for FFR, MoA, and CRR frauds. Nevertheless,
several previous studies have shown different results. DeZoort&Harrison
(2008) and ACFE (2008) found that external auditors perceive more
responsibility for detecting FFR than they do for MoA and CRR. Other
studies have shown different results that internal auditors are more familar
and accept higher responsibilities in detecting MoA than FFR and CRR (KPMG
2003, 2006). The inconsistency of the research results motivates the
researcher to examine whether the perceived responsibility of the internal
government auditor to detect fraud is different among the three types of
fraud. Accordingly, we questioned whether internal auditors’ perceived
responsibility for detecting fraud would differ across fraud type. This leads
to the following hypotheses: H1 : Perceived responsibility of internal
auditors' in detecting fraud does not differ among fraudulent financial
reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption. 3.2. The Impact of
Accountability on Perceived Responsibility Schlenker (1997) defined 
accountability as accountability to audiences to do something in accordance
with established standards by fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and
other costs. Schlenker&Leary (1982) discussed social anxieties created when
accountability pressures occur. Accountability concepts use Carver's (1979)
model of"self-attention" in which an increasing concerns the fulfillment of a
person's standard accomplishments. Nevertheless, Tetlock (1992) proposed
a model of social contingency that suggested accountability pressures can
stimulate politically motivated needs to sustain the positives of constituents
critical evaluative. The Triangle Model of Responsibility suggests that 
accountability and responsibility are related but in different constructs.
Schlenker (1997, 250) stated that responsibility is not identical with 
accountability, in fact, that responsibility is the result of accountability. This
suggests that accountability is a form of pressure on internal auditors by
others (eg senior management, audit committees, internal audit standards
and others), and the perceived responsibility is an internal response of
internal auditors to external pressures. Several studies have shown the role
of accountability to affect the performance of auditors on testing strategies
(Asare et al., 2000), task complexity (Tan&Kao 1999), justifications of
audit-planning decisions (Koonce et al. 1995),memory for audit Evidence
and judgment (Tan 1995) and accounting decision settings (Ashton 1990).
Accountability affects the effects of dilution (Hoffman&Patton 1997).
Accountability affects opinion (Johnson&Kaplan 1991) and judgment audit
(Kennedy 1993). Accountability effects on a social judgments and choices
(Buchman et al. 1996; Lerner&Tetlock 1999). Study of Dezoort&Harrison
(2008) showed that accountability and anonymous influence perceived
responsibility and brainstorming in detecting fraud. Thus, accountable
auditors have higher perceived responsibility than auditors who do not get
accountability. This indicates that the pressure of accountability increases
the individual responsibility in detecting fraud. Based on this framework, this
research builds the following two hypotheses: H2 : Accountable auditors
have degree of perceived responsibility for detecting fraud higher than
anonymous auditors. 4. RESEARCH METHOD 4.1. Subject One hundred and
two internal auditors in Indonesia participated in the experiment. We
collected data for this project during visited education and training functional
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Internal auditor Indonesian government. Subjects were assigned randomly
to experimental conditions. Participation was voluntary. Two consecutive
experimental sessions were held. Subjects had no opportunity for
communications between experimental sessions. An approximately equal
number of subjects took part in each of the experimental sessions. Total
sample that can be analyzed in this research is 92 (ninety two) research
samples or about 90% (ninety percent). There are 10 data can not be
processed because respondents do not fill experimental instruction
completely. 4.2. Research Design The experiment applied a 3x2 between-
subject design. The independent variable was level of fraud type and
cognitive style. We manipulated three level fraud types as FFR, MoA and
CRR and accountability was manipulated as ACC and ANN. 4.3. Procedures
Experimental Task All experimental tasks can be completed in approximately
forty minutes. The task that participants must perform is the first time
participants are asked to fill in their identities as internal auditors at the
government agencies in which they work. The questions include name, age,
gender, education, workplace agency, job title, length of service and amount
of audit experience. In addition, participants were also asked to select the
accountability pressure provided. Second, participants should do to
understand the information about the government agency and the fraud
content that occurs therein. There are three types of fraud to be tested
(FFR, MoA, CRR) in which participants are presented only one type of fraud
for detection. The participants were then asked to answer questions related
to auditor's perceived responsibility based on three elements of triangle
model of responsibility from Schlenker (1994). In the last session a question
was asked for manipulation checks to ascertain whether participants
understood the given experiment assignment scenario. 4.4. Research
Scenario All three fraud types describes a current period of fraud in an area
where the participants were conducting internal audit work. The FFR
scheme, the head of health department has included third party health fees
retribution worth 200 million in the annual financial statements. This fraud
occurs because he has been unable to collect third party health fees for two
years. The MoA scheme describes a situation where the head of health office
has committed theft of cash by making fake purchases of pharmacy. He
uses fake documents of certain pharmaceutical companies to place orders
and bills on purchasing of unreal pharmacy. The CRR scheme illustrates that
he has a health equipment procurement program by nepotism in selecting a
supplier company and doing project value engineering. Participants are
informed that the head of the health office is cheating by acting alone (not
colluding) and the cheating is unknown to others. 4.5. Measures Perceived
responsibility to detect fraud as measured by six questions related to the
triangle model of responsibility links. Specifically, two questions related to
the prescription-identity (professional obligation) link, two questions related
to the prescription-event (task clarity) link, and two questions related to the
identity-event (personal control) link. The questions were measured using a
100 point scale (Schlenker et al. 1994). Accountability variable is
conditioned on two levels: accountable and anonymous. Accountable
participants are participants who respond to reviews by providing their
personal identity either through their name or email address. While
anonymous participants do not provide personal information and have no
attempt to make contact with reviewers for their responses. The
accountability pressure shown the response of personal information is
considered to be the pressure placed by others such as senior management,
audit committees, internal audit standards and others. 5. RESULTS 5.1.
Manipulations Checks Table 1 shows that the participants found that the
research scenario is realistic (mean = 82.15 on a 100-point scale anchored
“Very unrealistic” and “Very realistic”) and understandable (mean = 67.55 
on a 100-point scale anchored “Very difficult to understand” and “Very easy
to understand”). The participants also found that the fraud cases is material
(mean = 74.70 on a 100-point scale anchored “Very immaterial” and “Very
material”). Participans have likelihood of detection (mean = 73.80 on a 100-
point scale anchored “no chance of detection” and “absolutely would”).
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Participans are willing to change of responsibility (mean = 74.90 on a 100-
point scale anchored “far less responsibility” and “far more responsibility”).
Table 1 Manipulation Checks Materiality Understandable Realistic Likelihood
of Detection Change of Responsibility Mean Std. Deviation 74.70 2.030
67.55 2.284 82.15 1.671 73.80 1.932 74.90 1.486 5.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics perceived responsibility based on
fraud type scenarios and accountability pressures. Tabel 2 Descriptive
Statistic FFR MoA Crr ACC ANN N 29 29 34 43 49 Mean 75.24 81,69 78,68
81,84 75,65 Median 80.00 83.00 83.00 83.00 78.00 Variance 214.404
160.007 245.862 153.187 247.731 Std. Deviation 14.643 12.649 15.680
12.377 15.739 Minimum 45 52 30 45 30 Maximum 95 100 100 100 100
Range 50 48 70 55 70 Interquartile Range 26 18 17 17 28 Skewness -.524
-.557 -1.265 -.953 -.703 Kurtosis -.923 -.337 1.773 1.054 -.010 Note: FFR,
fraudulent financial reporting; MoA, misappropriation of assets; Crr,
corruption; ACC, accountable; ANN, anonymous. Table 2 presents mean and
standard deviation of participants who were given fraudulent financial
reporting (mean=75.24; std.dev=14.643), misappropriation of assets
(mean=81.69; std.dev=12.649) and corruption (mean=78.68;
std.dev=15.680) scenarios. Descriptive statistic perceived responsibility
fraud detection for accountability pressure shows that mean of accountable
and annonymous participants is 81.84 and 75.65 with std. Dev 12.377 and
15.739. 5.3. Tests of Hypotheses Hypothesis one (H1) states that the
responsibility of the internal auditor's perceived responsibility in detecting
fraud does not differ between fraudulent financial reporting,
misappropriation of assets and corruption. One way anova is used to test
hypothesis 1. Panel A of table 3 presents one way anova test result indicates
that the value of F on test of between subjects is 1.445 with a probability
significance of 0.241. A probability value above 0.05 indicates no significant
difference in average between the three test groups. Thus it can be
concluded that the average perceived responsibility for detecting fraud
among groups of three types of fraud does not differ significantly. It can be
concluded that the internal auditor's perceived responsibility in detecting
fraud does not differ between fraudulent financial reporting,
misappropriation of assets and corruption. Adjusted R Squared value of
0.010 indicates that variability of perceived responsibility for detecting fraud
can only be explained by variability of fraud type difference of 1%. Table 3
Result of Hypotheses Test Panel A. Test Results of One-way anova Fraud
Type Levene Tests F Sig Test of Between Subjects F Sig Fraudulent Financial
Reporting Missappropriation of Assets 0,437 Corruption 0,674* 1,445
0,241* R Squared = ,031 (Adjusted R Squared = ,010) *significant at the
.05 level Panel B. The results of the Independent Sample T-test
Accountability Levene Test F Sig Equal Variance Assumed T Sig Accountable
Annonymous 3,858 0,053 2,074 0,041 *significant at the .05 level Panel B
of table 3 shows that F arithmetic levene test show that probability
significance of 0.053 (F=3.858, p >.05), it can be concluded that both
groups have the same variance. T-test different test results show that
probability significance of 0.041 (t= 2.074, p < .05). That indicates
significant mean difference between the two test groups. Thus it can be
concluded that the average perceived of responsibility for detecting fraud
between accountable and annonymous groups differed significantly.
Hypothesis two (H2) states that internal auditors that given accountability
pressure have degree of perceived responsibility of detecting fraud higher
than auditors without accountability pressure was supported. 5.4. Additional
Analisys To assess the relationship between the three responsibility points
based on the theory of triangle model of responsibility (Schlencker 1994), it
uses six question items. Two questions relate to the relationship of 
prescription-identity (professional obligation), two questions relate to the
prescription-event relationship (task clarity) and two questions relate to the
identity- event relationship (personal control). The questions are measured
using a 100-point scale. Table 5 presents the average perceived
responsibility for each question based on a fraud type scenario. Table 5
Mean of Perceived Responsibility Result TMoR Link FFR MoA Crr ACC ANN PO
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#1 80,69 84,83 80,29 86,05 78,12 PO #2 76,90 90,34 84,12 87,44 82,80
PO Mean 78,80 87,59 82,21 86,75 80,46 TC #1 75,86 79,31 78,82 81,16
75,42 TC #2 70,34 78,28 77,65 78,84 72,60 TC Mean 73,10 78,79 78,24
80,00 74,01 PC #1 73,79 76,90 75,00 78,37 72,50 PC #2 72,50 80,69
76,18 80,71 72,80 TC Mean 73,15 78,79 75,59 79,54 72,65 
http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp 431 Where: PO#1 : Professional
obligation (prescription-identity) link is measured by asking “How relevant is
detecting this fraud to your job?” PO#2 : Professional obligation
(prescription-identity) link is measured by asking “How obligated are you to
detect this fraud?” TC#1 : Task Clarity (prescription-event) link is measured
by asking “How clear is your authoritative guidance for detecting this fraud?”
TC#2 : Task Clarity (prescription-event) link is measured by asking “How
informed are you about procedures you should follow to detect this fraud?”
PC#1 : Personal control (identity-event) link is measured by asking “How
much control do you have as an auditor over your ability to detect this
fraud?” PC#2 : Personal control (identity-event) link is measured by asking
“How much contribution do you believe you can make to detection this
fraud?” The question items on "PO#1 and PO#2" are related to the
professional obligation (prescription-identity) link. The question on "PO#1 is
measured by asking "how relevant is detecting this fraud to your work?".
The question on "PO#2" is measured by asking "how far is your obligation to
detect the fraud?". In the types of fraud fraudulent financial reporting,
missappropriation of assets and corruption, the average answer to question
PO#1 is 80.69, 84.83 and 80.29 respectively. While, mean answer to
question of PO#2 is 76.90, 90.34 and 84.12 respectively. This result shows
that perceived responsibility of detecting fraud based on the element of
professional obligation indicates that the reason of relevance is higher than
the reason of detecting obligation to the internal auditor of Indonesian
government for fraudulent financial reporting. The reason of relevance is
lower than the reason of detecting obligation to the internal auditor of
Indonesian government for missapropriation of assets and corruption. The
question items on "TC#1 and TC#2" are associated with the task clarity
(prescription- event) link. The question on "TC#1" is measured by asking
"how clear is your authorization guide to detecting the fraud?". The question
on "TC # 2" is measured by asking "How did you get information about the
procedure to be followed to detect the fraud?". In the types of fraud
fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption the
average answer to TC#1 question is 75.86, 79.31 and 78.82. While, mean
answer to the question of TC#2 is 70.34, 78.28 and 77.65. Thus this result
shows that the perceived responsibility for detecting fraud based on the task
clarity element indicates that the reason for "authorization" is higher than
the reason for "information" in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of the
Indonesian government for fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation
of assets and corruption. The question items on "PC#1 and PC#2" are 
related to the personal control (identity- event) link. The question on
"PC#1" is measured by asking "how much control do you have as an internal
auditor for your ability to detect the fraud?". The question on "PC#2" is
measured by asking "how many contributions can you provide in detecting
the fraud?". In the types of fraud fraudulent financial reporting,
missappropriation of assets and corruption the average answer to PC#1
questions is 73.79, 76.90 and 75.00 respectively. While, mean answer to the
question of PC#2 is 72.50, 80.69 and 76.18. Thus this result shows that the
perceived responsibility for detecting fraud based on personal control
elements indicatesthat the reason for "control" is higher than the reason for
"contribution" in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of Indonesian
government for fraudulent financial reporting. The reason for control is lower
than the reason of contribution in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of
Indonesian government for missapropriation of assets and corruption. At
accountable and annonymous accountability pressures, the average answer
to the PO#1 question is 86.05 and 78.12,while, 87.44 and 82.80 for PO#2.
Thus, this result shows that the perceived responsibility of detecting fraud
based on the element of professional obligation indicates that the element of
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relevance is lower than the obligation to detect fraud. Mean answer to TC#1
question is 81.16 and 75.42, the average answer to TC#2 question is 78.84
and 72.60. Thus this result shows that the perceived responsibility for
detecting fraud based on task clarity element indicates that the reason for
"authorization" is higher than "information" in detecting fraud. The average
answer to PC#1 questions is 78.73 and 72.50, whereas the average answer
to PC#2 questions is 80.71 and 72.80. Thus, this result shows that the
perceived responsibility of detecting fraud based on personal control
elements indicates that the reason for "control" is lower than the reason of
"contribution" in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of Indonesian
government. 6. DISCUSSION There are several findings in this study. First, 
the average perceived responsibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud
does not differ significantly between FFR, MoA and CRR. This result differs
from the results of research by Dezoort&Harrison (2008) and ACFE (2008)
that indicated external auditors received higher responsibilities in detecting
FFR than MoA and CRR. The results of this study also differ from other
research results which show that internal auditors are more familar in
detecting MoA than FFR and CRR (ACFE 2008, KPMG 2003, 2006,
DeZoort&Harrison 2008). Based on the Triangle Model of Responsibility
theory, fraud scenarios whether FFR, MoA and CRR, professional bond
obligation elements are higher in explaining perceived responsibility than
task clarity and personal control. In the fraud type scenario for both the FFR,
MoA and CRR, the reasons for the relevance of the fraud case faced in the
assignment do not differ significantly with the responsibility for detecting
fraud. This suggests that the absence of a difference in perceived
responsibility of detecting fraud among the three types of fraud is consistent
with no difference in the reasons the auditor perceives that responsibility in
his or her job. In Triangle Model of Responsibility theory, the professional
element of obligation is a combination of prescription and identity. The
relationship refers to the extent to which certain prescriptions (Auditing
Standards of Internal Auditors of the Government of Indonesia) are deemed
applicable to the actor (auditor). Thus it can be concluded that the internal
auditors of the Indonesian government feel clearly and firmly that to detect
fraud is their responsibility. Although within the Indonesian Government's
Internal Audit Standards (SAAIPI) there are no detailed articles on the
responsibilities of government internal auditors in detecting fraud. Third, the
results of this study also finds that there is a difference in the average
perceived responsibility for detecting fraud between groups of auditors who
are under significant accountable and anonymous accountability. Perceived 
responsibility of the internal government auditor to detect fraud in the
accountable group is higher than the anonymous group. Based on the
Triangle Model of Responsibility theory, for auditors who have accountable
or annonal accountability pressures, the professional bonds element is
higher in explaining perceived responsibility than task clarity and personal
control. Moreover, for auditors with accountable or annonymous pressures,
the reasons related to job relevance detect fraud in jobs are lower than for
reasons related to direct responsibility in detecting fraud. Thus, the reasons
related to the level of responsibility of the task in detecting fraud become
more dominant than the relevance of the case at hand. Although these two
reasons are not significantly different for the auditor in perceiving their
responsibility in detecting fraud. The results of this study are consistent with
studies conducted by DeZoort&Harrison (2008) which showed that
accountability affects perceived responsibility in detecting fraud. The results
of this study also support studies that examine the role of accountability for 
auditor performance. As Asare et al. (2000), Tan&Kao (1999),Cloyd (1997),
Koonce et al. (1995), Tan (1995) and Ashon (1990) showed that
accountability had an effect on the performance of the auditor . The results
of this study are expected to provide an empirical contribution to the theory
of responsibility The Triangle Model of Responsibility (Schlenker 1997) which
is a psychological theory that can confirm the perceived responsibility of the
auditor's in detecting fraud. The Triangle Model of Responsibility places that
perceived responsibilities of the internal government auditor as a direct
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function of the power of the three psychological relationships among the
three formative elements of responsibility. Findings from the results of
hypothesis testing one (H1) and hypothesis two (H2) prove that the
determinant factor of a person to be responsible can be explained by
professional elements of obligation, task clarity and personal control.
Government agencies/regulators should be able to provide clearly guidance
and reference on the risks and ways of detecting various types of fraud
cases faced by government agencies. Thus, although the auditor faces
different types of fraud, it is expected that they still have high responsibility
and optimal effort in detecting any types of fraud cases they have to deal
with. In addition, related to the role of accountability pressure, by review an
auditor, internal auditor is expected to have more responsibility and high
effort in detecting fraud. Such reviews may be from institutions such as
BPKP (Finance and Development Supervisory Agency) or BPK (Audit Board
of the Republic of Indonesia), AAIPI (Association of Indonesian Government
Internal Auditors) or other authorized parties. 7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH The results of this study have limitations on level of internal
government auditors who tend to only be at level one. Thus the researcher
can not draw conclusions thoroughly at all levels of government internal
auditors in Indonesia. It is expected that in the future, researchers can then
use data at all levels of auditor so that the overall conclusion can be
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